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China in collaboration with Pakistan has integrated Kashmir in its grand strategy to contain India. 
Beijing’s involvement in various mega projects related to construction and development of strategic 
infrastructure in the Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir (PoK), influx of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
in the Gilgit-Baltistan region, adoption of visa-related controversial policies and invitation to 
India’s Kashmiri separatist leader, are being seen in the India’s official and strategic circles, as the 
encirclement of India by China through Kashmir. During the Cold War era, Beijing had bestowed 
Pakistan with the status of ‘spoiler state’ in order to weaken the natural predominance of India in the 
South Asian region. Nevertheless, now, it is being viewed that China has transformed Pakistan into a 
‘ frontline state’ to contain the increasing Indian influence at regional and global levels. In this context, 
Kashmir is being used as an instrument by the Beijing and in this strategy; Beijing Administration 
is being complemented equally by the Islamabad Administration. Gilgit-Baltistan, where an anti-
Pakistan movement for Balawaristan is simmering, has become the epic centre of Chinese activities. 
In the emerging scenario, Sino-Pakistan nexus has emerged as a gainer and, India, the US and even 
people of Gilgit-Baltistan have become the prime losers. The Sino-Pakistan nexus in Kashmir has put 
strategically India at a disadvantageous position while people of Gilgit-Baltistan are to be the victims 
of suppression of both Pak army as well as the PLA. In long-term perspective, mega projects, and large 
scale human activities in PoK especially in Gilgit-Baltistan, are going to be disastrous for the local, 
regional and extra-regional-environment. India is taking counter-measures from developing strategic 
infrastructure to enhancement of its military capabilities to thwart any prospective threat. 
Keywords: China, Pakistan, Kashmir, PoK, Gilgit-Baltistan, People’s Liberation Army, Visa, 
Strategy.
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Introduction
China’s relative power and influence vis-à-
vis other global powers particularly the United 
States have grown more extensively in recent 
times even than expectations of the Beijing 
Administration (Jisi, 2011: 68). It has attained 
impressive economic and military capabilities as 
it is the world’s second largest economy, largest 
exporter and a major creditor nation (Blanchard, 
2011: 32). Due to its improved position, Beijing 
Administration’s conduct has turn out increasingly 
to be assertive in international relations. This has 
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been observed even by the Chinese scholars like 
Wang Jisi, from Beijing’s sturdy reactions to a 
chain of events in 2010 espousing Washington’s 
decision to sell arms to Taiwan, US-South Korean 
military exercises in the Yellow Sea, and Japan’s 
detention of a Chinese sailor found in disputed 
waters (Jisi, 2011: 68). In this assertive behaviour 
of China, Pakistan is not remained a ‘spoiler 
state’, but in turn, gradually has transformed to 
a ‘frontline state’ of Beijing’s grand strategy in 
the global, Asian and Indian contexts. On the one 
hand, China wants to be a dominant the power in 
global affairs while curtaining and replacing the 
US influence in the Asian continent especially 
and on the other, it is ambitious to prevent India 
from becoming powerful enough to challenge its 
evolving hegemony in the region. A wide range of 
factors including the US presence in Afghanistan, 
and the Indian role in China’s diverse global and 
regional interests are influencing the Beijing’s 
strategy in the South Asia especially in relations 
to Kashmir. Thus, it is imperative to understand 
China’s grand strategy in the global, Asian and 
Indian context and also to view how and why 
China has transformed Pakistan from a ‘spoiler 
state’ into a ‘frontline state’ vis-à-vis India in 
the context of Kashmir. Ultimately, as a result of 
Sino-Pak nexus on Kashmir what type of gainer-
looser syndrome has emerged for the concerned 
parties and moreover, which way the Indian state 
has counteracted the situation? 
China’s Grand Strategy:  
Diverse Contexts
Grand strategy of any country contains its 
defined core national interests, identified real or 
perceived threats to them and vision, strategy 
and modus operandi of the national leadership to 
advance those interests and counter the threats 
to them(Jisi, 2011: 68). Amidst its consistent 
foreign and defence policies that have enough 
coordination with the country’s domestic 
priorities, the Chinese government has yet to 
disclose any document which comprehensively 
explains Beijing’s strategic goals and methods 
to achieve the same. However, like any country, 
generally, it is said that, China defines its 
core national interests to territorial integrity, 
sovereignty, security and national independence. 
It, further, encompasses regime preservation, 
a role and prestige commensurate with China’s 
power rank and economic capabilities (Wang, 
2005: 669-694). China, though officially denies, 
also defines its national interest to revision the 
international system or hegemony in the Asian 
continent in general and South Asian region in 
particular. Beijing perceives the United States 
as primary threat to its enumerated interests. 
It is because of the latter’s backing of Taiwan, 
strategic partnerships with India, Japan and South 
Korea, military might, human rights pressure, 
and dominance in global institutions(Wang, 
2006: 4-9). The secondary but crucial hurdle for 
Beijing’s designs in South Asian and even in the 
South East Asian context, as it is perceived by 
China, is India, an emerging Asian power and 
global player which has close ties with Russia, 
and in recent years, has emerged as an important 
strategic partner of United States at global level 
and of South East Asian Countries especially 
of Vietnam at regional level. China has not 
cordial relations with India due to its disputes 
on territorial borders, Tibet and Dalai Lama and 
thus even had invaded and defeated India in 1962. 
The rise of India, as an economic and military 
power, its nuclear power status and its claim and 
lobbying for permanent seat in the UN Security 
Council, deepening strategic partnership with the 
US and South East Asia and East Asian countries 
and overall, its increasing reputation at the global 
level and its recognition at various international 
forums, is perceived as threat to the Chinese 
interests. Though, Beijing, officially, does not 
acknowledge so but even then, it is responding 
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to its perceptions. It has adopted diverse range of 
strategies to put off the US and Indian challenge. 
These strategies involve the development of 
asymmetric military capabilities, construction of 
soft alliances with Iran, North Korea, Venezuela 
and Pakistan, encouragement of multilateralism 
and support for multipolarity against the US 
unipolarity, reassurance and promulgation 
of friendly foreign doctrine and soft power 
projection(Goldstein, 2002: 842:858). Therefore, 
overall scenario is that, China in its grand strategy, 
apart from keeping away the internal and external 
threats to its sovereignty, is ambitious enough to 
replace the US unipolarity and contain the rise 
of Indian influence so that Beijing may be able 
to establish itself as hegemonic at regional and 
global levels. 
China-Pakistan Relations:  
Convergence of Strategic Interests
Since China perceives US and India as 
hurdles to achieve its agenda at global and 
regional levels, as it is also being discussed in 
the US and Indian strategic circles, Beijing has 
adopted above said strategies to contain these 
countries. The international environment is also 
looking favourable for Beijing particularly in case 
of Pakistan’s souring relations with the US and 
Islamabad’s increasing dependence on Beijing.
Historically, China and India have divergent 
views on the regional stability in South Asia, 
South East Asia and the Middle East. Beijing 
has given primacy to its own strategic interests 
while pursuing a non-accommodative approach 
towards others’ especially of India (Kapila, 2003: 
NP). In this context, Beijing has never recognized 
the natural predominance of India in South Asia. 
Infact, China along with the US and Britain 
brought the term ‘South Asia’ into usage in lieu 
of the ‘Indian sub-continent’ to de-emphasize 
India’s natural predominance in the sub-continent 
and to soothe their protégé Pakistan. Responding 
to the hostile security environment in South Asia, 
India built a sizable conventional military force 
as a part of its defensive strategy and, created a 
nuclear deterrent. Amid the Cold War politics, 
at frequent intervals, the US bestowed a “spoiler 
state” status to Pakistan. Since 1962, China 
also dealt Pakistan identically vis-à-vis India to 
disturb the natural power structure in South Asia 
(Kapila, 2002: NP). After the entry of Soviets 
into Afghanistan in 1979, the US used Pakistan 
as ‘frontline state’ first to counter the Soviets in 
Afghanistan, then to throw out the Taliban from 
Kabul, and also to fight against their resurgence. 
However, as it has been observed, since 2008 
onwards a chain of events have soured the 
relations of US-Pakistan. The US cooperation 
with India, singing of nuclear deal with New 
Delhi while denying for the same to Islamabad, 
US officials’ statements regarding the Pakistani 
links and support to terrorist outfits, and then so-
called unilateral US military actions in Pakistan 
territory against the Islamic militants, killing of 
24 Pakistani soldiers by the US led NATO forces 
and thereby, violations of Pakistan’s sovereignty, 
and more recently, the freeze of $700 million 
US aid by the US Congress to Islamabad have 
a role in the decline of US-Pakistan friendship. 
This, wedge between US and Pakistan, has given 
an opportunity to China to be more close to 
Islamabad and also Islamabad to be dependent on 
China (Chellaney, 2011: NP). China has entered 
into nuclear deal with Pakistan, appreciated 
Pakistan’s role as ‘frontline state’ in the global 
war against terrorism, and asked the US to respect 
the sovereignty of Pakistan. This Chinese support 
to Islamabad have lauded by the Islamabad 
administration. China is called as an ‘all-weather 
friend’ of Pakistan, a strategic partner, a reliable 
source of trade and aid and closest military 
ally. If China has extended its “unconditional 
support” to Pakistan’s sovereignty, independence 
and territorial integrity, then Pakistan has given 
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“unwavering support” to China on Taiwan, 
Tibet and Xinjiang related issues which concern 
China’s core interests (Embassy of The People’s 
Republic of China in The Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, 2011b: NP). 
China’s relationship with Pakistan is driven 
by its own national interests. Pakistan was only 
reliable diplomatic partner of China during the 
years of Beijing’s international isolation and, 
even at present, it remains a useful gateway for 
Chinese penetration in the energy-rich Islamic 
Middle East(Wirsing, 2003: 1). In early 1970s, 
Pakistan served as a bridge for the establishment 
of Sino-US diplomatic relations and helped to end 
the diplomatic isolation of China once suffered.
Pakistan has also been benefited from the 
friendship with China. Unlike others, Beijing 
does not expect or even insists on Islamabad to 
surrender or subjugates its own national interests 
to the Chinese interests. Moreover, as Pakistan 
feels, China does not interfere in Islamabad’s 
internal affairs as its “much touted” friend, the 
US generally does. (Editorial, Frontier Post, 26 
August, 2011). Indeed, China has given aid to 
Pakistan with no “strings attached” (Xiaoqiang, 
2011: NP). After the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, 
on the request of Pakistan, China exercised its 
veto first time to install the move of Bangladesh 
to be the member of the United Nations. As a 
result of that, Pakistan succeeded in bargaining 
with India to release the prisoners of war (PoWs) 
and return the troops to pre-war positions. Again 
after the India’s nuclear explosion in 1974, China 
assisted Pakistan to build its two defence related 
mega projects – the Heavy Rebuild Factory for 
T-59 tanks and the F-16 Aircraft Rebuild Factory 
– to make Pakistan self-reliant in the production 
of conventional weapons. China not only extended 
its political support to Pakistan on the question of 
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, but also covertly 
provided military supplies of worth $200 
million annually to the Afghan rebels fighting 
against the Soviets. When Pakistan was under 
the US sanctions for its secret nuclear weapons’ 
programme, China served as a primary source 
of Pakistan’s military hardware and assisted its 
nuclear and missile programmes(Rahman, 2011: 
214). Hence, both countries supported each other 
whenever it was required and, therefore, they 
came closer. Apart from historical Sino-Pak 
closeness, their common enmity with India also 
strengthened the ties of Beijing and Islamabad. 
Most important common strategic interest of 
Beijing and Islamabad is the containment of 
India, and therefore, both have given reciprocal 
support for this cause. As Kanwal Sibal writes:
Pakistan wants to have parity with 
us [India]; China wants to be the dominant 
power in the region. Pakistan wants to 
limit India’s regional as well as global 
role by blocking us [India] westwards 
so that we [India] don’t have easy access 
to Afghanistan and Central Asia; China 
wants to confine us [India] to South Asia, 
keep us entangled in the sub-continent so 
that we [India] are unable to fully exert our 
[Indian] influence in the rest of Asia and 
beyond, giving China space and time to 
entrench its influence there without having 
to face competition from India. Pakistan is 
determined to confront India and China is 
intent on giving Pakistan the means and the 
confidence to continue this confrontation 
(2011a: NP).
Thus, it establishes the above given argument 
that, for the common strategic interest vis-à-vis 
India, Beijing and Islamabad have served one 
another as a “counterweight” to India and hedge 
against the “Indian adventurism” (Wirsing, 2003: 
2). Now, amidst the Islamabad’s souring relations 
with Washington, the Sino-Pak closeness is 
being considered a positive trend in Pakistan’s 
international relations. Pakistan’s Prime Minister 
Yousuf Raja Gilani describes the Islamabad’s 
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recent close friendship with Beijing as “…higher 
than mountains, deeper than oceans, stronger 
than steel, and sweeter than honey” (Feigenbaum, 
2011: NP). During his visit to China on 27th 
September, 2011, Pakistan’s Prime Minister 
Gilani even told the Chinese Public Security 
Minister Meng Jianzhu that: 
Your (China’s) friends are our 
(Pakistan’s) friends. Your (China’s) 
enemies are our (Pakistan’s) enemies, and 
your (China’s) security is our (Pakistan’s) 
security (Feigenbaum, 2011: NP).
In the current scenario, Pakistani analyst 
Ashraf Javed also views Sino-Pakistan closeness 
in an optimistic way. He writes:
As relations between Washington and 
Islamabad continue to slide down from bad 
to worse followed by a spat of suggestions, 
warnings and ultimatums by the high-
ranking US officials, the supportive 
statements by China in favour of Pakistan’s 
sovereignty gave some respite to the current 
dispensation in this country( 2011: NP). 
In other words, it can be argued that recent 
decisions of Washington and New Delhi have 
brought more depth to the Sino-Pak strategic 
partnership (Wirsing, 2003: 4). However, in this 
situation, if Pakistan has become less reliant 
on the US and more close to China, then its 
closeness has made India ‘extremely’ nervous. 
India might be holding the US ever-closer, but 
it can’t make New Delhi pleasant as it is being 
encircled by China. China stands as a clear rival 
to the Indian influence in Nepal, where it has 
built major cross-border highways from Tibet, 
and is in the process of extending its rail network 
to Kathmandu. Same is in case of Bangladesh, 
where Beijing is assisting in the development 
of a deep-sea port at Chittagong. In the other 
Indian backyard, i.e. Sri Lanka, China is now 
the country’s largest aid donor, and is helping to 
build a major new port terminal at Hambantota. 
Beijing has even enjoyed free rein with the 
military junta in Burma (Watters, 2011: NP). 
Encirclement of India can be observed from 
a variety of developments which have been 
occurred in the Sino-Pakistan relationship in the 
context of Kashmir. 
China’s Grand Strategy’s  
Kashmir Connection 
The emerging trends in Sino-Pakistan 
relationship and China’s activities, in recent years, 
both unilateral and joint with Pakistan in the 
context of Kashmir especially Pakistan-Occupied 
Kashmir (PoK) clearly point out that Beijing has 
integrated Kashmir in its grand strategy while 
making Pakistan as ‘frontline state’ against India 
and that, it has clear-cut ambitions to exploit the 
bi-lateral dispute to bottle up India in the sub-
continent. 
As it is known to all, Kashmir is a disputed 
issue between India and Pakistan. Kashmir is 
broken into pieces. One piece is an integral part of 
India. Other one is PoK which is administratively 
divided into two parts – ‘Azad Kashmir’ and 
Gilgit-Baltistan which are known as ‘Northern 
Areas’ in Pakistan. Gilgit-Baltistan is situated 
between the Hindu Kush and Karakoram range 
of mountains in the north and western Himalayas 
in the south. It encompasses seven districts 
namely Gilgit, Skardu, Diamir, Ghizer, Astore, 
Ghanchi and Hunza Nagar, bordering Xinjiang 
in China, the Afghan Pamirs in the north and a 
480 kilometers long Line of Control (LoC) in the 
south(Raina, 2009: NP). Pakistan had ceded a part 
of Hunza-Gilgit called Raskam and the Shaksgam 
Valley of Baltistan to China in 1963 to seek 
nuclear know-how from that country. Gilgit-
Baltistan region’s strategic location is important 
for India, Pakistan, China and United States. The 
area is very important to China as many trade 
tracks from China to Pakistan are situated in this 
territory (Zahra, 2010: NP). While pointing out 
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the strategic importance of the Gilgit-Baltistan 
region from Pakistani perspective, Sajjad Shaukat 
writes that:
…strategic location of the Northern 
Areas is of a greater geo-political importance 
for Pakistan, linking major parts of South 
Asia, Central Asia and South East Asia. 
Besides India, Pakistan’s clandestine rivals, 
America and Afghanistan on one hand and 
its close friend, China on the other also 
consider it as strategically important. In the 
present era of economic wars, the region 
is the backbone of our country’s economy, 
and trade with China entailing future 
partnership with the Central Asian states. 
Pakistan imports almost all kind of items 
from China via Karakorum Highway. These 
areas are significant in respect of natural 
resources containing precious minerals 
such as gold, ruby, emerald, iron ore and 
uranium. Water is another major source. 
Pakistan’s major source of water is River 
Indus which flows through this region. It 
was also due to its ideal strategic location 
of this region that India had occupied the 
Siachen Glacier, deputing its forces below 
50 and 60 degree freezing point peaks, and 
compelled Pakistan to defend its Northern 
Areas (2011: NP). 
In addition to strategic importance of the 
region, in Gilgit-Baltistan, there is a widespread 
nationalist movement for an independent 
Balawaristan consisting of Gilgit-Baltistan. 
Local nationalist groups such as Gilgit-Baltistan 
Democratic Alliance (GBDA), Gilgit-Baltistan 
United Movement (GBUM) and Balawaristan 
National Front (BNF) are struggling for 
independent Balawaristan. The BNF is 
playing a leading role which claims Chitral 
and Kohistan as inseparable parts of Gilgit-
Baltistan, the region to which this organization 
calls ‘Balawaristan’. Leaders of the Balawaristan 
movement especially Abdul Hammed Khan, 
Chairman of Balawaristan, considers Pakistan as 
source for many problems of the local people and 
therefore there is a demand for independent state 
of Balawaristan. Nevertheless, Pakistan blames 
India, Afghanistan and the US for instigating the 
national uprisings in the area. As the Pakistani 
writer Sajjad Shaukat views:
New Delhi and Kabul with the covert 
support of Washington have already been 
creating lawlessness in various regions of 
Pakistan by fuelling sectarianism – are 
also converting our Northern Areas into 
another volatile place where they have been 
manipulating anti-Pakistan sentiments to 
achieve their secret strategic goals (2011: 
NP).
Inspite of the allegations against India, 
Afghanistan and the US, Pakistani writer accepts 
the existence of “anti-Pakistan sentiments” among 
the people of Gilgit-Baltistan. Nevertheless, 
Islamabad has done little to understand and 
address the grievances and subsequently, pacify 
the anti-Pakistani feelings of the people of Gilgit-
Baltistan. Instead of soothing such sentiments, 
Pakistan has attempted to suppress them by using 
military means through deployment of huge 
number of military forces in the region. 
Since China perceives India as a key player 
that it needs to engage with to fulfill its grand 
strategy, Kashmir has evoked great interest of 
China in this context. Though, China is eager to 
access the rich natural resources of Central Asia 
through the expansion of its trading interests, 
constant conflict over Kashmir between India 
and Pakistan has provided an opportunity to 
China to make Kashmir instrumental in its grand 
strategy. In the 1990s China had shifted its hard 
stances of self-determination for Kashmir to one 
of Kashmir as a de-facto part of India. Analysts 
in India visualize that Beijing has signalled to 
change its earlier stance towards Kashmir policy 
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by considering the Indian part of Kashmir as a 
‘disputed territory’, intentionally to integrate in 
its geo-political strategy in Central Asia, Indian 
Ocean and Persian Gulf areas(Kapila, 2010: NP). 
Pakistan is compliant to Beijing’s strategy in the 
context of Kashmir. Following developments 
reveal that Pakistan has not only facilitated the 
intrusion of China in Kashmir especially in 
Gilgit-Baltistan area to give it defacto control 
over the region but has also attempted to make 
China a party to the dispute:- 
A) Construction and Development 
Strategic Infrastructure: Beijing is involved in 
various construction and development projects 
in PoK particularly in the Gilgit-Baltistan. It has 
been estimated that China is funding at least 
767 development projects related to strategic 
infrastructure in the Gilgit-Baltistan region. 
Reportedly, at least 122 Chinese companies are 
funding 14 mega projects related to strategic 
infrastructure (Times Now, 19 September, 2010: 
NP). This includes construction of dams, bridges 
and roads especially construction, maintenance 
and expansion of the Karakoram Highway 
(KKH). 
The KKH connects Gilgit-Baltistan with 
Kashgar in China’s Xingjiang province 1,300 
kilometer long distance. This Highway is 
significant as it cuts through the zone between 
Asia and the Indian sub-continent, where China, 
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan 
come within 250 kilometer of each other. For 
China and Pakistan, the KKH is significant for 
dual civil and military purposes. It is channel 
of bilateral trade between China and Pakistan, 
and adding to this, from Beijing’s perspective, 
it is integral to keep Pakistan’s military strength 
sustained against India. Therefore, Memorandum 
of Understanding(MoU) was signed in June 2006 
between China’s state-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission and the 
National Highway Authority of Pakistan(NHAP) 
to expand the KKH from 10 metres to 30 metres 
with its operational capacity going up three-fold. 
Agreement was also signed between the China 
Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) and the 
NHAP for upgradation and widening of the KKH 
Phase-2 which links the Thakot Bridge to Sazin. 
This was to accommodate the heavy vehicles in 
extreme weather conditions and is supposed to 
be completed in 2012. The MoU was also signed 
by the NHAP with the China Gezhouba Group 
International Engineering Company Limited to 
widen the Jaglot-Skardu road (Chansoria, 2010: 
3). Apart from roads, other strategic infrastructure 
related projects of Beijing in PoK includes the 
construction of a dry port at Sost, water-diversion 
channels and telecommunication facilities. The 
port at Sost, on the Sino-Pak border, is connected 
by the KKH to Karimabad, Gilgit and Chilas in 
the south and the Chinese cities of Tashkurgan, 
Upal and Kashgar in the north. The port of Sost 
holds the potential to serve as a key channel of 
trading activity for the Central Asia(Chansoria, 
2010: 3). 
China has also focussed on the power sector 
to exploit the huge hydro-electric power potential 
of the region. Construction of a hydro-power 
station at Bunji, in the Astore district of the Gilgit-
Baltistan region was also decided through the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed 
between Pakistan and China in August 2009 when 
Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari had visited 
to China. The cost of proposed Bunji Dam is $7 
billion with a purported capacity to generate 7,000 
megawatts (MW) of electricity (Raman, 2009: 
NP). The deal has been undertaken on a build-
operate-transfer basis, with the entire investment 
made available by China. Significantly, the Bunji 
project is just one of the eight hydel projects that 
are to be constructed (Chansoria, 2010: 3 and; 
Ghosh, 2011: NP).
China is also associated with the construction 
of a $12.6 billion Diamer-Bhasha Dam on the Indus 
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River – 165 kilometers downstream of Gilgit and 
40 kilometers downstream of Chilas. This project 
is aimed at to generate 4,500 MW of electricity 
per day. This project is on its way for completion 
in 2016. Beijing had agreed to grant Pakistan $121 
million supplier credit to establish a link line 
between Karakoram Highway and the Bhasha 
Dam site to facilitate the transportation of heavy 
machinery which is required for its construction 
of Dam. In August, 2011, China’s biggest 
state-owned hydropower firm, Sinohydro has 
discussed the project of this Dam with Pakistan’s 
Federal Minister for Water and Power, Syed 
Naveed Qamar, and Qamar had even invited the 
Sinohydro’s support for the construction of other 
two dams, the Gomal Zam and Darawat projects. 
Besides, China’s Gezhouba Hydropower Group 
has signed a deal to work on the Neelum-Jhelum 
Hydropower Project (Krishnan, 2011: NP). 
Chinese companies have agreed to construct 
bridges in PoK. A Chinese firm, CWE, has signed 
agreement to build a bridge on the Jhelum river 
in Mirpur. Cost of this project is $22 million. 
The Xinjiang Road and Bridge Construction 
Company is indulged in the construction of 
five permanent bridges. Adding to this, the 
Xinjiang Surpass Mining Company Limited 
has undertaken the mineral exploration in the 
Satpara district of PoK and this company has 
also submitted another mining proposal of $6 
million. Moreover, Chinese companies are also 
working on a proposal of the construction of a 
railway line in Gilgit-Baltistan region that would 
connect Xinjiang and the Arabian Sea. Chinese 
companies have, even, completed a pre-feasibility 
study on the engineering and financial aspects of 
the project (Chansoria, 2010: 3). 
China is also putting in an 85 percent 
investment in the construction of 165 kilometer 
long Jaglot-Skardu road and 135 kilometer long 
Thakot-Sazin road in the Gilgit-Baltistan region 
(Chansoria, 2010: 3). Beijing also plans a pipeline 
to connect Xinjiang to Gwadar for transport of 
oil from the Gulf. As China is indulged in such 
activities in PoK with the consent of Pakistan, 
in Indian circles, it is observed that, by and 
large, Islamabad’s strategy is to cede de facto 
control of Gilgit-Baltistan to Beijing to make 
it a ‘stakeholder’ in the Kashmir issue(Kapila, 
2010: NP). Pursuing such strategy, Pakistan is, 
thereby, willing to convert a bilateral issue to 
trilateral issue giving a boost to China’s grand 
strategy. After receiving the reports of Chinese 
companies’ involvement in PoK, India, ahead of 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s meeting with 
his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao in Hanoi, 
had decided to ‘blacklist’ the China’s companies 
indulged in the strategic infrastructural 
development in the PoK. New Delhi felt that such 
Chinese companies should not allowed to work in 
India(Times Now, 25 October, 2010: NP). 
B) Influx of Chinese Troops: Apart from 
the Chinese involvement in construction and 
development projects, the influx of an estimated 
7,000 to 11,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation 
Army in PoK was also reported in August 2010. Selig 
S. Harrison, Executive Director of Washington-
based think tank, Center For International 
Policy, in his article, “China’s Discreet Hold on 
Pakistan’s Northern Borderlands”, which was 
published in The New York Times on 26th August, 
2010 cited the presence of PLA in the Gilgit-
Baltistan (Harrison, 2010: NP). He reported that 
until recently these soldiers were lived in the 
temporary encampments. But after completion 
of their assignments, they were building big 
residential enclaves there which establish the 
China’s design for a long-term presence of PLA 
soldiers in PoK. Harrison had also highlighted the 
issue of the construction of 22 tunnels in secret 
locations while raising the apprehensions that 
the said tunnel could be used for missile storage 
(Harrison, 2010: NP). Initially, China said that 
PLA troops are stationed in PoK solely for flood 
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relief efforts, but the construction of permanent 
residential enclaves for the PLA soldiers instead 
of the original temporary encampments that they 
used to live in indicates that PoK’s guests from 
the East intend their stay to be more long-term 
in nature. This reflects that China’s encroachment 
into PoK has other long-term ambitions besides 
its prospects of energy trade in Middle East and 
Central Asia (Bakshi, 2011: NP). In addition to 
this, possibility of PLA soldiers’ involvement in 
assisting the Pakistan army in the suppression of 
Balawaristan movement of the people of Gilgit-
Baltistan can not be ruled out.
The influx of Chinese troops in PoK was 
confirmed to Indian authorities by the US 
intelligence agencies. This was disclosed openly 
in April, 2011 by the Chief of the Northern 
Command, Lieutenant General K.T. Parnaik, 
when he said that “We have strong real time 
intelligence sharing mechanism with US and they 
have conveyed the same thing to Indian agencies 
including RAW – that these troops are stationed 
all along the LoC in PoK” (North Korea Times, 
9 April, 2011). While answering to Lok Sabha, in 
April 2011, India’s Defence Minister, A.K. Antony 
also acknowledged the Chinese presence in PoK. 
He said that India had conveyed its concerns to 
China and also asked Beijing Administration to 
stop its infrastructure development activities in 
PoK (News, 2011b: NP). 
C) Controversial Visa Policy: China’s 
controversial visa policy also reveals its strategy 
towards Kashmir. China had started to treat 
people of Indian Kashmir distinctly by issuing 
the stapled visas the treatment which it did not 
apply to the residents of PoK. Reportedly, the 
Chinese Embassy had started issuing stapled visa 
in May 2009 to the people from Indian Kashmir. 
These stapled visas were not recognized by the 
Indian immigration authorities. Indian authorities 
had said that by issuing such visas, China was 
refusing to recognize Kashmir as a part of India 
and considering it as ‘disputed territory’ (Hussain, 
2011: NP). Similar type of stapled visa was started 
to issue in January 2011 by China to residents of 
Arunachal Pradesh which Beijing refers to as 
“Southern Tibet”. Chinese officials had even said 
that Beijing’s policy of issuing stapled visas to 
“all disputed regions” was remained consistent 
and unchanged (The Hindu, 22 July, 2011). 
Another matter related to China’s visa policy 
was emerged in the mid-2010 due to Beijing’s 
refusal to give visa to Lieutenant General B.S 
Jaswal, Army’s General officer Commanding-in-
Chief, Northern Command because according to 
Beijing, he was responsible for “disputed” region 
of Jammu and Kashmir (Hindustan Times, 27 
August, 2010). Interestingly, in the past China 
had not refused visa to the Army Commander 
who was also commanding troops deployed in 
Arunachal Pradesh an area which claimed by 
Chinese. Thus in Indian defence circles, denial 
of visa to Lieutenant General Jaswal was viewed 
a part of its grand strategy (Pradhan, 2010: NP). 
India had refused to recognize the China’s stapled 
visas policy as it was questioning the Indian 
sovereignty over a particular region. Responding 
to the Chinese denial of visa to Army General, 
India had suspended defence exchanges with 
China (Hindustan Times, 27 August, 2010). 
These ties were resumed, after nearly a year 
long freeze, during the Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh’s visit to Beijing in April 2011 
as China agreed to give a “proper visa” to Major 
General Gurmeet Singh, who had to lead the 8 
members Indian defence delegation to China. 
Major General Gurmeet Singh was also serving 
as the Commander of the Delta Force, a part of 
the specialized anti-insurgency Rashtriya Rifles 
deployed in the Jammu and Kashmir (Indian 
Express, 16 June, 2011).
D) Invitation to Kashmiri Separatist 
Leader: Beijing’s changing attitude towards 
Kashmir considering it as “disputed territory” 
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has also given it a chance to interfere directly in 
the internal politics of Indian Kashmir in favour 
of secessionists as well as Pakistan. This is 
evident from the Chinese invitation to Kashmiri 
secessionist leader Mirwaiz Farooq to visit China 
for dialogue. Indian think-tanks are expecting 
“greater Chinese interference” in this field. Thus 
it would be a challenge for the Indian intelligence 
agencies to keep an eye on the Chinese intelligence 
penetration in the Kashmir secessionist movement 
and its connections with the Kashmiri separatist 
leaders. In the India’s strategic circles, this move 
has been observed as that China is signaling New 
Delhi to lay off Tibet and not to dabble in Tibet 
affairs(Kapila, 2010: NP). 
All these Chinese activities in PoK are 
contradictory to its declared stand on the South 
China Sea dispute. In a way, Beijing has itself 
disregarded its own policies in PoK by objecting 
to India’s exploration activity in Vietnamese off-
shore blocks in South China Sea where Beijing 
claims its “indisputable sovereignty”(Sibal, 2011: 
NP). If India can not explore the oil from the 
“disputed” South China Sea, then, how China 
can be indulged in various construction related 
activities and deploy its army in PoK?
Pakistani Perspective over  
the Beijing’s Activities in PoK 
Both Beijing and Islamabad have repeatedly 
refuted the Indian charges of its military 
encirclement by China in Kashmir. Infact, 
Pakistan views that India has its hegemonic 
intentions in the South Asian region and therefore, 
‘Pakistan-China friendship’ is considered by 
India as source of threat to these intentions due 
to which New Delhi is leaving no opportunity in 
creating a wedge between Beijing and Islamabad. 
It is argued that for this India intentionally linked 
rioters in Kashgar and Hotan to Pakistan and then 
a negative opinion that Chinese Deputy Premier 
has visited to Pakistan to warn Islamabad 
over terrorist being trained in its tribal areas 
was constructed by the Indian media. While 
reacting to New Delhi’s claims in case of China’s 
‘construction’ and ‘development’ related activities 
in the PoK. In the official, academic and media 
circles of Pakistan, it has been opined that it is 
a ‘trivial’ issue which is being sensationalized 
by India. In the context of Chinese assistance 
to Pakistan in upgradation and expansion of 
Karakoram Highway (KKH), Ashraf Javed, a 
Pakistani analyst writes:
The Karakoram Highway is the 
lifeline that connects Gilgil-Balitstan from 
Kashgar, a city in the Xingjiang region of 
China, to Abbotabad. An extension of the 
highway south west from Abbotabad, in the 
form of N-35, meets the Grand Trunk Road, 
N-5 at Hassanabdal Pakistan that would 
finally link to the southern port of Gwadar 
in Balochistan through Gwadar-Dalbandin 
Railway. Chinese engineers and builders 
are in Gilgit-Baltistan region to help repair 
the Karakoram corridor which has been 
severely damaged by the earthquakes, 
floods and landslides (2011: NP). 
Pakistan thinks that the KKH trade route 
agreement and the KKH project have alarmed 
many powerful economies. Besides, the Kashgar-
Gwadar trade route affected the trade and 
economic interest of neighboring states of the 
region. According to Pakistani perspective, New 
Delhi alongwith Washington do not like Chinese 
working on developments in Pakistan and thus 
are creating such sensations(Javed, 2011: NP) . 
In the context of presence of Chinese army 
in PoK, Pakistan has denied the US reports as 
well as the Indian allegations. Infact, it has been 
argued that:
…the theme of Chinese troops 
presence in GB has been blown out of 
proportion so as to deny Chinese access 
to Karakoram. Indian strategists consider 
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that infrastructural improvements of 
the ‘Karakoram Corridor’ heralds a new 
phase of China flexing its muscles not 
only against India but more significantly 
against US in the wider global context. 
India’s propaganda regarding ceding of the 
Gilgit-Baltistan to China is a dubious ploy 
to politically implant US against Pakistan 
that it is no longer a frontline state of US 
strategy. All this is aimed at undermining 
the strategic relationship between the two 
countries (Javed, 2011: NP). 
In brief, Pakistan accepts the importance of 
KKH but denies the Chinese activities are aimed 
at to encircle India in Kashmir. Hence, it is being 
argued that New Delhi is propagating about “the 
presence of PLA soldiers” and “development of 
infrastructure in PoK” especially Gilgit-Baltistan 
to undermine the US-Pakistan relationship. 
Gainer-Loser Syndrome 
In the China’s grand strategy, Pakistan, 
beings its frontline state is emerging as the 
major beneficiary. Pakistan has achieved direct 
results in economic and military cooperation 
with China. China contributed $20.5 million 
humanitarian aid to Pakistan for earthquake 
relief in 2005. China has entered into nuclear deal 
with Pakistan and provided two nuclear reactors. 
China has become Pakistan’s second largest 
trading partner. Pakistan’s major infrastructure 
and engineering projects are being done by 
the Chinese enterprises (Xiaoqiang, 18 May, 
2011: NP). More than 200 Chinese companies 
involving 13,000 engineers and technicians are 
indulged in the various projects ranging from 
infrastructure, energy and agriculture to higher 
level of science and technology, finance and 
aerospace (Embassy of The People’s Republic 
of China in The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
2011: NP). Pakistan’s annual bilateral trade with 
Beijing has exceeded rapidly from $4.2 billion in 
2005 to $8.7 billion in 2011 and, both countries 
are committed to achieve the target of $15 billion 
(Embassy of The People’s Republic of China in 
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 2011a: NP and; 
Javed, 2011: NP). Its joint military manoeuvers 
have increased China. Through joint efforts, as 
a Pakistani analyst Ashraf Javed argues, these 
countries have successfully developed hi-tech 
military equipment such as K-8 jet trainers, 
type-2000 main battle tanks and the Xiaolong 
fighter jet. Pakistan is the largest arm receiver of 
China. China has agreed in May 2011 to provide 
50 new JF-17 Thunder multi-role fighter lanes to 
Pakistan Air Force with the possibility of J-20 
Stealth and Xiaolong multi-purpose light aircraft 
in the pipeline (Javed, 2011: NP). In November, 
2011, Pakistan concluded a joint military exercise 
named ‘Friendship-IV with China. In this joint 
military exercise 260 Chinese troops and 280 
Pakistan troops had participate. The exercise was 
fourth in the series and was another step towards 
better bi-lateral military cooperation between 
Beijing and Islamabad (Embassy of The People’s 
Republic of China in The Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, 2011b: NP). 
China in its strategic partnership with 
Pakistan appears to be absolute gainer vis-
a-vis India as it has been able to change geo-
strategic equations in the region. Upgradation 
of KKH, development of roads and railway 
lines along with the construction of dams and 
tunnels and deployment of PLA soldiers in 
PoK make a grip of China on the strategic area 
while assuring it unfettered road and rail access 
to the Gulf through Pakistan. A reason behind 
the costly projects is commerce. Since Beijing 
has build ports in Gwadar and Ormara in the 
south-western Pakistan for transporting oil and 
gas from the Gulf and Africa through Xinjiang 
(Hasnain, 2011: NP). At present, it takes a 
Chinese tanker about 16 to 25 days to reach 
the Gulf. Nevertheless, after the completion 
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of road and rail links through Gilgit-Baltistan, 
China would be able to transport cargo to and 
from Xinjiang to Gwadar and to other Pakistani 
port facilities, within 48 hours(Harrison, 2010: 
NP). But, the upgradation of KKH and railway 
line would cutdown the time which it takes 
to transport the resources from Gwadar to 
Xinjiang. China would be able to send its goods 
to the affluent Gulf market in within a short 
time of span through the same route. Besides its 
strategic stronghold and access to the Persian 
Gulf, it would be significantly able to influence 
the geopolitics and trade in the Indian Ocean 
Region and Central Asia(Chaudhari, 2011: NP). 
China has also emerged as absolute gainer 
in terms of military perspective. After the 
completion of such strategic projects, China 
would weaken India’s position on Kashmir and in 
the entire region by denying it’s a strategic depth 
(Hasnain, 2011: NP). Reason being, improved 
roads and rail into Gilgit-Baltistan, alongwith a 
series of mountain tunnels, constitute military 
assets, forged through a region sensitive for India 
and even Russia(Dyer, 2011: NP). The KKH and 
other ongoing projects related to infrastructural 
development in PoK would enhance the China 
logistic capacity against New Delhi especially 
in terms of fuel supplies which is necessary to 
prosecute sizeable military operations against 
India in the western front opposite to the 
Ladakh region. In addition to this, as it has been 
apprehended by the New Delhi-based think tanks 
like Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses 
(IDSA) and South Asia Analysis Group(SAAG), 
this can pose a combined China-Pakistan, the 
development of strategic infrastructure in PoK by 
China increases the threat of a combined China-
Pakistan military activity against India. In such 
a case, the developing strategic infrastructure 
in Gilgit-Baltistan would facilitate speedy 
and enlarged Pakistan army deployments to 
complement China’s military offence against 
India in the Ladakh region (Kapila, 2010: 
NP and; Chaudhari, 2010: NP). The Chinese 
military deployment has its potential relevance 
to the coalition forces in Afghanistan and even, 
the Asian balance of power. Though, China is 
unlikely to indulge in any overt military action 
against the coalition forces in Afghanistan, yet it 
can make common cause with Pakistan in Kabul 
by backing or opposing local factions to induce 
an outcome which they consider favourable for 
both Beijing and Islamabad(Dyer, 2011: NP). 
China’s “high-stake poker game” in 
Gilgit-Baltistan has prospective disastrous 
environmental consequences for the whole of 
South and South East Asia. Syed Iqbal Hasnain, 
a glaciologist and Distinguished Fellow at the 
Stimson Centre in Washington, DC, opines 
that construction of mega dams and building of 
roads and tunnels in this mountainous area is 
invitation to disaster. This is likely to enhance 
the seismic activities and exaggerate the glacier 
melt which are already occurring in the region. 
In 2005, more than 86,000 people were died in 
PoK just to the south of Gilgit-Baltistan as a 
result of an earthquake of 7.6 magnitudes. The 
epic centre of the earthquake was the border of 
Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan. This is location 
where Chinese companies are constructing the 
Diamer-Bhasha dam. The Diamer-Bhasha dam 
as a huge water reservoir inundating more than 
100 miles of mountainous ravines in future 
would make earthquakes more probable as the 
still water induces increased seismic activities. 
As per the opinion of glaciologist Hasnain, the 
construction of mega dams in this region is also 
thoughtless because snow and glacier melt are 
the only source of all water in the region’s rivers 
and rivulets. The melt depends on temperature. 
Consequently, water-level of the rivers and 
rivulets fluctuate constantly. In case of a glacier 
lake bursts out due to excessive glacier melt 
or seismic activity, dam water would be over-
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tapped. In case of a huge flood resulting into large 
amount of debris and sediments getting deposited 
in the Dam may threaten its long term stability. 
Construction of Dam also demands human costs. 
The Diamer-Bhasha Dam with a proposed height 
of more than 250 meters would displace tens of 
thousands of people and submerge habitable 
areas and thousands of acres of agricultural land. 
This would also lead to the loss of countless 
archaeological relics (Hasnain, 2011: NP). 
Black carbon is the second leading 
contributor to climate change. Along with 
the increased civil human activities and huge 
deployment of military, the presence of Black 
carbon is already leading to the high de-
glaciation rate in the western Himalayas. The 
upgradation of KKH and construction of railway 
line and tunnels are also bound to intensify the 
glacier melting and endanger the infrastructure 
of the region (Hasnain, 2011: NP). Glaciologist’s 
analysis establishes that most of the economic 
benefits of these projects would be for China and 
other provinces of Pakistan and not for the people 
of Gilgit-Baltistan. 
Therefore, in brief, China is absolute 
gainer vis-a-vis India as well as US in the Asian 
continent. China’s upgradation of the Karakoram 
Corridor on Pakistan’s behalf enables China’s 
strategic outreach to the North Arabian Sea and 
the Gulf. Building oil and gas pipelines through 
this Corridor would strengthen the Beijing’s 
military postures in Western Tibet and Xinjiang 
against India. This would also be instrumental 
in countering the NATO’s creeping influence in 
the China’s peripheries. In this overall scenario, 
Washington and New Delhi are the main losers 
vis-à-vis China-Pakistan cooperation in global 
and regional contexts. 
India’s Counteractions
Amid the growing concerns over the 
Beijing’s assertive behaviour and its change 
in policy towards New Delhi’s dispute with 
Islamabad over Kashmir, India is taking different 
counter-measures to thwart any Chinese or joint 
Sino-Pak military move against it. New Delhi 
has raised two new mountain divisions of 36,000 
troops each. Two new battalions of Arunachal 
Pradesh and Sikkim scouts comprising 5,000 
locally recruited troops are also being raised 
with plans for a new mountain strike corps 
and third artillery for the area. Indian air 
force has begun to deploy two squadrons of 
Su-30MKI aircraft to Tezpur air base, close to 
the Line of Actual Control with China. India 
has upgraded airstrip in the Ladakh region of 
Jammu and Kashmir bordered PoK. It is also 
upgrading six airstrips in Arunachal Pradesh. 
Further, alongwith the acquisition of AWACS 
aircraft and ground-based air defence close to 
the Line of Actual Control (LAC), New Delhi 
has bolstered its security with 19 low-altitude 
transportable medium-power radars (News, 
9 March, 2011). The Indian navy also plans to 
strengthen its eastern fleet by basing an aircraft 
carrier in the Bay of Bengal. India has stepped 
up its naval interactions with the US and with 
South-East and East Asian states. An increased 
naval presence in the Indian Ocean is being 
countered by bilateral Indian naval exercises 
with Singapore and Vietnam in the South China 
Sea and with the US and Japan off Okinawa 
(News, 9 March, 2011a). 
Adding to this, further, in December, 2011, 
Indian navy has received a Russian ‘Nerpa’ 
nuclear submarine rechristened as ‘INS Chakra’ 
on lease for ten years worth $920 million. The 
submarine is capable of remaining underwater 
for months. The Nerpa is an Akula-II class attack 
submarine. The Akula-II class submarines are 
equipped with 28 nuclear-capable cruise missiles 
with a striking range of 3,000 kilometers. The 
Indian version is expected to be armed with 300 
kilometers club nuclear-capable missiles. With 
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this addition, India has become only the sixth 
operator of nuclear submarine in the world (Press 
Trust of India, 2011: 16). 
Apart from military capabilities, India is far 
behind from China in terms of the development 
of strategic infrastructure. Therefore, 
understanding this weakness, at the moment, 
apart from the enhancement of its military 
capabilities, New Delhi has also started to focus 
on the construction of strategic infrastructure that 
may be used for dual civil and military purpose. 
Irrespective of difficult terrain and topography 
of Kashmir, India has initiated various projects 
to connect Kashmir with the other parts of the 
country. Apart from widening the existing roads 
and repairing/constructing the bridges, India has 
planed to create a statewide network of railway 
line. On 4th January, 2012, Indian government 
sanctioned an amount of 19,000 crore rupees for 
the Udhampur-Baramulla section of the railway 
project which is scheduled to be completed 
in 2017. Earlier, work on 119 kilometer long 
Qazigund-Baramulla section was completed 
in 2009. Besides this, works of the Udhampur-
Katra section of 25 kilometers and the Katra-
Qazigund section of 148 kilometer distance will 
be completed in 2013 and 2017 respectively. 
The Jammu-Udhampur section of 54 kilometer 
long distance was operationalized in 2005. 
The Qazigund-Srinagar-Baramulla stretch was 
also commissioned in 2009. The completion of 
excavation work for the 11 kilometer long tunnel, 
the longest in the country, through the Pir Panjal 
Mountains in October, 2011, was a landmark 
in the efforts of Indian state towards the 
development of infrastructure in Kashmir. This 
tunnel runs below the existing Jawahar tunnel 
and will reduce the traveling distance between 
Banihal and Qazigund from 35 kilometer to 11 
kilometer only (Service, 2012: 6). Thus, India’s 
attempts to enhance the military capability and 
projects related to strategic infrastructure in 
Kashmir could be seen as the counter-measures 
to the Sino-Pak nexus on Kashmir. 
Conclusion
In nutshell, one can argue that China 
perceives India, apart from the US, as a threat 
to its influence at regional and global level. 
Beijing Administration, in its grand strategy, is 
eager to revision the international system while 
containing the US unipolarity and establishing 
itself as a global power. The emergence of India 
as an important player in international relations 
and its natural predominance in the South 
Asian affairs is difficult to digest for China. 
China considers India as its rival in South Asia, 
South East Asia and even in the Middle East 
and thus, is pursing a policy of encirclement 
to contain the rising India. Pakistan, due to its 
hostile relations with India, is a compliant to 
the Beijing’s strategy towards India. Beijing and 
Islamabad have formed strategic nexus vis-à-
vis New Delhi. During the Cold War era, China 
used Pakistan as a ‘spoiler state’ in the South 
Asian region to deny India its natural dominance 
in the area. China gave conventional arms 
and nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan 
and supported its political perspective on the 
various international foras. In return, Pakistan 
also supported Beijing on the issue of Taiwan, 
Tibet and Xinjinag. Since India has entered into 
nuclear deal with the US, the US-Pak relations 
have soured continuously on various issues such 
as the Pak support to terrorism, violation of Pak 
sovereignty by the US or killing of Pak soldiers 
by the US led NATO forces. These events have 
increased dependence of Islamabad on Beijing 
vice versa Beijing has transformed Islamabad 
into a frontline state against India. China has 
also changed its Kashmir policy in collaboration 
with Pakistan against India. Beijing is aimed 
at to encircle India in the context of Kashmir 
and hence it has integrated Kashmir in its 
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grand strategy. Islamabad Administration is 
facilitating the Beijing to pursue its strategy. Its 
presence in the PoK especially Gilgit-Baltistan 
at large scale makes it an interested party to 
the ‘dispute’. Pakistan is also willing to convert 
bilateral dispute into trilateral issue to boost the 
China’s grand strategy and to put psychological 
pressure on New Delhi. China’s involvement in 
the construction and development of strategic 
infrastructure including the upgradation of 
KKH, creation of a railway line in the area to 
strengthen links with Xinjiang and construction 
of hydro-projects in the Gilgit-Baltistan would 
enhance economic as well as strategic benefits 
of China and Pakistan vis-à-vis India. It will 
enhance the China’s strategic outreach to the 
North Arabian Sea and the Gulf. Building oil 
and gas pipelines through this Corridor would 
strengthen the Beijing’s military postures 
in Western Tibet and Xinjiang against India 
and would be instrumental in countering the 
NATO’s creeping influence in the China’s 
peripheries. Deployment of PLA troops in 
PoK is not a positive sign for India. Adoption 
of visa related controversial policy towards the 
Indian part of Kashmir and invitation to India’s 
Kashmiri separatist leaders also establish the 
ill-intentions of the Beijing. Apart from India, 
people of Gilgit-Baltistan will also be losers as 
the PLA army can be used to assist the Pak army 
in the suppression of Balawaristan movement 
by Islamabad. In long term, mega projects and 
other human activities in PoK are also incorrect 
from environmental perspective as these would 
bring disastrous results at the local, regional and 
extra-regional level. Though, India has emerged 
as prime loser in the context of Chinese inclusion 
of Kashmir in its grand strategy, yet it has also 
adopted certain counter-measures ranging 
from the enhancement of military capabilities 
to development of strategic infrastructure 
particularly in the Indian part of Kashmir. 
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Большая стратегия Китая: Кашмир и Пакистан.  
Пекин превращает Исламабад  
из штата-спойлера в прифронтовой штат
Доктор Сунил Кумар
Отделение стратегических и региональных исследований,
Университет штата Джамму
Джамму-180 006-Джамму и Кашмир, Индия
Китай в сотрудничестве с Пакистаном включил Кашмир в свою большую стратегию по 
окружению Индии. Участие Пекина в различных мегапроектах в сфере строительства и 
развития стратегической инфраструктуры в Кашмире, оккупированном Пакистаном, (КОП), 
присоединение к Народной освободительной армии (НОА) в регионе Гилгит-Балтистан, 
принятие противоречивых визовых политик и приглашение в Индию Кашмирского лидера 
сепаратистов рассматриваются в официальных кругах Индии как окружение Индии 
Китаем через Кашмир. Во времена Холодной войны Пекин дал Пакистану статус «штата-
спойлера», чтобы ослабить естественное доминирование Индии в Южно-Азиатском регионе. 
Тем не менее, сейчас мы наблюдаем, как Китай превращает Пакистан в «прифронтовой 
штат» с целью получить растущее влияние Индии на региональном и глобальном уровнях. В 
данном контексте Пекин использует Кашмир в качестве инструмента в своей стратегии; 
Dr. Suneel Kumar. China’s Grand Strategy, Kashmir and Pakistan: Transformation of Islamabad from a Spoiler State…
действия Правительства Пекина в полной мере дополняются действиями Правительства 
Исламабада. Гилгит-Балтистан, где начинает формироваться антипакистанское движение 
в пользу Балаваристана, стал центром деятельности Китая. Согласно развивающемуся 
сценарию китайско-пакистанский узел становится победителем, а Индия, США и жители 
Гилгит-Балтистана - проигравшими. Китайско-пакистанское сотрудничество в Кашмире 
стратегически поставило Индию в невыгодное положение, а жителей Гилгит-Балтистана 
под угрозу подавления со стороны армии Пакистана и НОА. В долгосрочной перспективе 
мегапроекты и крупномасштабная человеческая деятельность в Кашмире, оккупированном 
Пакистаном, особенно в Гилгит-Балтистане, приведут к разрушению местной, региональной 
и межрегиональной окружающей среды. Индия принимает контрмеры от развития 
стратегической инфраструктуры до увеличения своего военного потенциала, чтобы 
предотвратить эту потенциальную угрозу.  
Ключевые слова: Китай, Пакистан, Кашмир, КОП, Гилгит-Балтистан, Народная 
освободительная армия, виза, стратегия. 
